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Abstract
The process layout of chemical plants is usually designed in a compact configuration for economic efficiency. However,
most of the chemical process units are vulnerable to accidents such as fires and explosions, and these accidents can cause
severe damage to humans. In this study, direct risks to humans from such hazards were quantitatively assessed as individual
risk and converted into safety distances for each piece of process equipment. Then, a process layout optimization problem 
was formulated with risk zones constructed using those safety distances. Boundary factors accounting for land uses around 
the process site and protection factors from additional protective devices were also considered. A case study for an ethylene
oxide plant was conducted. With the proposed methodology, a cost-efficient and inherently safe layout can be provided in 
the early stage of the design of a process plant.
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1. Introduction
Chemical process layout optimization is a task to efficiently determine the relative position of the equipment 
or facility of the process. Here, efficiency means economic efficiency, operability and flexibility, availability 
for future expansion, safety and reliability, and/or environmental friendliness [1]. In many cases, economic
efficiency is the main objective, but considering the other elements, especially safety, is important for the
sustainability of the process.
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Many studies on layout optimization using various approaches have been done. Initially, the allocation of a 
facility was based on heuristic rules or a method using graph theory [2,3], but in recent years, mathematical 
programming has become the mainstream method. Layout problems formulated as mixed integer linear 
programming (MILP) [4,5] have been studied in the last two decades. Discrete grid and continuous plane 
approaches have been used for the domain of a process site as well as for its expansion to a multi-level process 
[7]. Stochastic formulation [1,8] and efficient solution algorithm of layout problems [9,10] have also been 
studied recently. 
For the arrangement of hazardous process units, safety is the most important element of the layout. This can 
be seen through the history of related accidents. For example, an explosion occurred at LPG filling stations in 
Bucheon, Korea in 1998 causing one death and 96 injuries [11]. The number of fatalities and injuries could 
have possibly been reduced if there had been a clear set of rules regarding the placement of equipment and 
safety distance between the facilities. In 2005, a fire and explosion occurred in a refinery in Texas, USA with 
15 fatalities and 170 injuries [12]. The direct cause of the accident was the ignition of flammable gas; however, 
the large number of casualties was the result of a tank trailer not being properly positioned. 
In this study, the risk to humans from process equipment was assessed as individual risk and then converted 
into safety distance. Based on the safety distance and minimum clearance required for operation, risk zones and 
maintenance zones around the process equipment were constructed. A layout optimization problem was then 
formulated in MILP with the non-overlapping constraints of these zones. Boundary factor and protection factor 
were also considered for the surrounding land use and additional protective devices. The proposed 
methodology was applied to an ethylene oxide plant as a case study. 
 
Nomenclature 
݅, ݆ process equipment 
݌ protective device 
ݎ distance from process equipment 
ݏ site candidate 
ݒ accident event outcome 
ܽ௜ , ܾ௜ dimension of equipment 
ܣ௜௝ ,ܤ௜௝ vertical distance between equipment 
ܥ௜௝
௣௜௣௘  unit cost of pipeline 
ܥ௟௔௡ௗ unit cost of land 
ܥ௣
௣௥௢௧  cost of protective device installation 
ܦ௜௝ rectilinear distance between equipment 
௘݂௢,௩ frequency of v 
݈௜ , ݀௜ horizontal and vertical length of equipment 
௜ܱ binary variable for equipment orientation 
݌௙௔௧ ,௥,௩ probability of fatality at r by v 
ܴ௜௝ ,ܮ௜௝  horizontal distance between equipment 
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ݔ௜ ,ݕ௜ coordinate of center of equipment 
ܳ௦ binary variable for site selection 
ܧ1௜௝ ,ܧ2௜௝  binary variables for non-overlapping constraints 
ܧ ௜ܵ spacing for equipment 
ܫܴ௥ individual risk at r 
ܮܣ land area 
ܲܫ௜,௣ binary variable for protective device installation 
ܣܴ௦ land area condidate 
ܤܨ boundary factor 
ܲܨ௣ protection factor 
ܲ ௜ܵ spacing for the public 
ܹ ௜ܵ spacing for workers 
2. Assessment of risk to humans 
The risk from process equipment can be quantified by quantitative risk assessment (QRA) [13]. Possible 
hazards from a target chemical process are identified and their frequency and consequences are analyzed. For 
frequency analysis, historical data or the frequency modeling technique can be used. For consequence analysis, 
there are several empirical models for each accident type such as vapor cloud explosion (VCE), fireball, flash 
fire or boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). These models provide the quantity of thermal 
radiation or overpressure from an accident. Then, probit analysis [14] is applied to get the probability of fatality. 
Generally, the product of frequency and consequence gives the measure of risk. 
2.1. Modified individual risk 
Among several risk measures based on the QRA result, we adopted the individual risk (IR) for the risk 
measure to humans in this study. IR is the risk to an individual near the hazard which considers the nature, the 
likelihood, and the time period of a possible injury to an individual [13]. One of the ways to obtain IR from the 
frequency and consequence analysis was suggested by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) [15]. Here, a 
simplified version of IR calculation assuming the worst-case accident scenario and weather- and direction-
independent effects of an accident was used. In that case, IR is the product of the frequency of the event 
outcome v and the probability of fatality by the event outcome v at distance r: 
ܫܴ௥ =෍ ௘݂௢,௩ ݌௙௔௧ ,௥,௩
௩
 
 
(1) 
HSE also proposed tolerable criteria for individual risk for people near a hazard. It is recommended to keep 
IR lower than 10-3 and 10-4 per annum for workers who are related to the source of the hazard, and for the 
public, respectively [16]. 
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2.2. Risk-based equipment spacing for humans
Since the effects of an accident vary by the distance from the source to the receptor, IR from hazardous
equipment also varies by the distance from that equipment. Therefore, the minimum distance from process
equipment to make the IR value lower than the recommended tolerances can be calculated. We defined such
distances as WSi for workers and PSi for the public, and constructed risk-based zones for process equipment 
shown in Fig. 1. In addition to these risk-based separation distances, some equipment requires space for
operability, maintenance or safety. This equipment spacing ESi constitutes the maintenance zone.
These hypothetical zones should not overlap the appropriate target, e.g. Risk zone I and worker space, Risk 
zone II and public area and the maintenance zone of the equipment and that of the other equipment.
Conventional non-overlapping constraints in the layout problem were modified to prevent overlapping of these
zones rather than the equipment itself.
Fig. 1. Risk-based zones around process equipment
3. Formulation of layout optimization
Based on the MILP model proposed by Papageorgiou and Rotstein [5], many features are replaced, modified 
or added to account for the risk-based zones in the following mathematical formulation.
3.1. Objective function
The objective of process layout in this study was to minimize the capital cost of the layout. Three types of 
costs were considered here: pipeline connection cost, land cost and installation cost of the additional protective
devices. To maintain the linearity of the problem, the land area was selected from candidates by adopting a 
binary variable. Eqs. (3)-(7) represent the case of a square site; however, a rectangular site was also considered 
using similar constraints with two binary variables.
݉݅݊݅݉݅ݖ݁ ෍෍ܥ௜௝
௣௜௣௘ܦ௜௝
௝ஷ௜௜
+ ܥ௟௔௡ௗܮܣ+෍෍ܲܫ௜,௣ܥ௣௣௥௢௧
௣௜
(2)
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ܮܣ =෍ܣܴ௦ܳ௦
௦
 (3) 
ܣܴ௦ = ݓ݅݀௦݀݁݌௦ 
 
(4) 

෍ܳ௦
௦
= 1 (5) 
ݔ௠௔௫ =෍ݓ݅݀௦ܳ௦
௦
 
 
(6) 
ݕ௠௔௫ =෍݀݁݌௦ܳ௦
௦
 
 
(7) 
3.2. Equipment dimension, orientation and relative distance 
The dimensions, orientation and rectilinear distance between the centers of equipment are defined with the 
same equations in [5]. 
݈௜ = ܽ௜ ௜ܱ + ܾ௜(1െ ௜ܱ) 
 
(8) 
݀௜ = ܽ௜ + ܾ௜ െ ݈௜ 
 
(9) 
ܴ௜௝ െ ܮ௜௝ = ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ 
 
(10) 
ܣ௜௝ െ ܤ௜௝ = ݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ 
 
(11) 
ܦ௜௝ = ܴ௜௝ + ܮ௜௝ + ܣ௜௝ + ܤ௜௝ 
 
(12) 
3.3. Maintenance zone constraints 
Eqs. (13)-(16) represent the non-overlapping constraints for the maintenance zone. By using two binary 
variables and the appropriate upper bound M, the relative positions of the maintenance zones for the equipment 
are set among left, right, above or below. 
ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ +ܯ൫ܧ1௜௝ + ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒
݈௜ + ௝݈
2 + ܧ ௜ܵ + ܧ ௝ܵ  
 
(13) 
ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ +ܯ൫1െܧ1௜௝ + ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒
݈௜ + ௝݈
2 + ܧ ௜ܵ + ܧ ௝ܵ  
 
(14) 
ݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ +ܯ൫1 + ܧ1௜௝ െ ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒
݀௜ + ௝݀
2 + ܧ ௜ܵ + ܧ ௝ܵ 
 
(15) 
ݕ௝ െ ݕ௜ +ܯ൫2െ ܧ1௜௝ െ ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒
݀௜ + ௝݀
2 + ܧ ௜ܵ + ܧ ௝ܵ 
 
(16) 
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3.4. Risk zone constraints 
As a special case of non-overlapping constraint, Eqs. (17)-(20) were used for Risk zone I. These constraints 
secure the safety distance between the process equipment and workspace. 
ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝ +ܯ൫ܧ1௜௝ + ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒ ܹ ௜ܵ + ௝݈2 
 
(17) 
ݔ௝ െ ݔ௜ +ܯ൫1െܧ1௜௝ + ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒ ܹ ௜ܵ + ௝݈2 
 
(18) 
ݕ௜ െ ݕ௝ +ܯ൫1 + ܧ1௜௝ െ ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒ ܹ ௜ܵ + ௝݀2  
 
(19) 
ݕ௝ െ ݕ௜ +ܯ൫2െ ܧ1௜௝ െ ܧ2௜௝൯ ൒ ܹ ௜ܵ + ௝݀2  
 
(20) 
For the upper and lower bound of the x- and y-coordinate of the equipment, the boundary factor BF is used 
together with spacing for public, PSi. According to the land use and type of corresponding boundary of the 
process site, four boundary factors are implemented. Here, the values of BF are 1 for a residential area, 0.8 for 
an industrial area and 0.5 for a vacant area such as a sea or wide road. These constraints force the Risk zone II 
to be placed within the process boundary. 
ݔ௜ ൒ ܲ ௜ܵܤܨ௪௘௦௧ 
 
(21) 
ݕ௜ ൒ ܲ ௜ܵܤܨ௦௢௨௧௛ 
 
(22) 
ݔ௜ + ܲ ௜ܵܤܨ௘௔௦௧ ൑ ݔ௠௔௫  
 
(23) 
ݕ௜ + ܲ ௜ܵܤܨ௡௢௥௧௛ ൑ ݕ௠௔௫   
 
(24) 
When additional protective devices are installed on hazardous process equipment, the risk to people can be 
reduced. This reduces the required safety distance, also. Therefore, actual risk-based spacing is calculated as 
follows: 
ܹ ௜ܵ =ܹ ௜ܵ௜௡௜௧ ቌ1െ෍ܲܫ௜,௣ܲܨ௣
௣
ቍ 
 
(25) 
ܲ ௜ܵ = ܲ ௜ܵ௜௡௜௧ ቌ1െ෍ܲܫ௜,௣ܲܨ௣
௣
ቍ 
 
(26) 
4. Case study 
The proposed layout optimization methodology was applied to an ethylene oxide (EO) plant [6]. Ethylene 
oxide is a valuable raw material for various chemicals; however, there have been many related accidents 
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because of its high reactivity and toxicity [17]. Therefore, a layout that minimizes the risks and costs rather 
than just costs alone is crucial for a sustainable process.
4.1. Process description
There are seven main process units in the EO plant shown in Fig. 2 (left). Their dimensions, cost, and 
connectivity are given in Table 1. In addition to the process equipment, we considered three workspaces ̢ a 
control room, laboratory and office ̢ to minimize the risks to employees. All equipment was considered to
have possible hazards. The selected accident scenarios were VCE, BLEVE, pool fire and flash fire.
The effect of the boundary factors was examined by selection problem between two candidates for the 
construction site of the EO plant. The candidates for the site are depicted in Fig. 2 (right): both sites are 
surrounded by two industrial areas, one residential area and one vacant area (sea); however, their directions are
different.
Moreover, information on additional installation of protective devices is presented in Table 2 and 3 [18].
The protective devices reduce the risk from the process equipment and therefore, the required land area;
however, additional costs are also required to achieve this.
         
Fig. 2. (left) Schematic diagram of the Ethylene oxide plant (right) Land uses around the candidate EO plant sites
Table 1. Equipment and their connectivity in the EO plant
Equipment Width
[m]
Depth
[m]
Purchasing cost
[$]
Connectivity Connection cost
[$/m]
1 Rx 5.22 5.22 335000 (1,2) 346
2 HX1 11.42 11.42 11000 (2,3) 118
3 EO Abs 7.68 7.68 107000 (3,4) 111
4 HX2 8.48 8.48 4000 (4,5) 85.3
5 CO2 Abs 7.68 7.68 81300 (5,1) 416.3
6 Flash 2.6 2.6 5000 (5,6) 86.3
7 Pump 2.4 2.4 1500 (6,7) 6.5
(7,5) 82.8
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Table 2. List of additional protective devices 
Protective Device Installation cost 
[$] 
Risk reduction 
factor 
P1 Additional cooling water 5000 0.1 
P2 Additional overpressure relief devices 20000 0.24 
P3 Additional fire relief devices 15000 0.25 
P4 Second skin on reactor 65000 0.6 
P5 Explosion protection system on reactor 20000 0.2 
P6 Duplicate control system with interlocking flow on reactor 20000 0.32 
P7 Duplicate control shutdown system on absorption tower 30000 0.46 
Table 3. Applicable configurations of the protective devices 
Configuration Reactor Absorbers 
K1 - - 
K2 P1 P1 
K3 P3 P2 
K4 P1,P3,P6 P1,P2 
K5 P1,P3,P5,P6 P1,P7 
K6 P1,P3,P4,P5,P6 P1,P2,P7 
4.2. Layout results and discussion 
Fig. 3 shows the layout results of the four cases considered. The thick solid lines represent the equipment 
and workspaces, while the dashed lines are maintenance zones. For Site 1 (a and b), the workspaces are 
allocated near northern boundary of the process site because the residential area is located on the northern 
process boundary, which provides the maximum spacing for the public for that direction. On the contrary, the 
workspaces are placed on the eastern boundary for Site 2 (c and d). The position of the residential area (east for 
this case) is the main reason for this layout. 
The square and rectangular site formulation resulted in different shapes of the site and land areas for Site 1, 
but not for Site 2. This is because the surrounding land use of Site 2 consists of a symmetrical industrial area, 
while that of Site 1 does not. 
The results for the comparison of the costs, site dimensions, and selected protective device configurations 
between sites 1 and 2 are presented in Table 4. The total layout cost was minimized for the rectangular site for 
option 1. The square site required more space because maximum spacing for the public in all four directions 
should be applied regardless of the boundary land use. 
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Fig. 3. Optimal layout results: (a) Site 1, square; (b) Site 1, rectangle; (c) Site 2, square; (d) Site 2, rectangle
Table 4. Comparison of layout results
Site option Site shape Cost [$] Site dimension [m, m2] Protection configuration
Connection Land Protection Total Width Depth Area Rx EO Abs CO2 Abs
Site 1 Square 21308 130340 40000 191648 70 70 4900 K3 K2 K3
Rectangle 21308 126350 25000 172658 50 95 4750 K3 K2 K2
Site 2 Square 22058 149625 10000 181683 75 75 5625 K2 K2 K1
Rectangle 22058 149625 10000 181683 75 75 5625 K2 K2 K1
A simple sensitivity analysis was conducted for some of the cost and safety parameters. As shown in Fig. 4, 
the boundary factor, spacing for the public, protection factor and land cost affected the total cost to a large
extent. These parameters are related to the required land size needed for the construction of the process site and 
the cost of the land accounts for most of the total layout cost. The spacing for the public PS is actually a
calculated value from the quantitative risk assessment; however, it was included in this sensitivity analysis
because it was treated as parameters in the layout optimization problem.
Fig. 4. Parametric sensitivity on total layout cost
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5. Conclusion 
In this study, a process layout optimization method based on quantitative risk assessment of a chemical 
process was presented. The risk zones were constructed from the safety distances for humans, which were 
converted from the modified Individual risk (IR) of the process equipment. Then, MILP formulation for layout 
optimization was carried out. This includes the constraints for the minimization of risks to people such as non-
overlapping constraints of these risk zones, boundary land use factor, and additional protective device 
installation. This framework was applied to an ethylene oxide plant, and the optimal layout considering the 
risks to people was found. The proposed methodology provides an economically efficient layout while the 
inherent safety of the process is enhanced by considering individual risks in the early stage of the design of a 
process plant. 
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